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Chapter 1
The Evolution of
Public Pensions
From the Roman Empire to the modern nation state, rulers and parlia-
ments have found it expedient to provide pensions for the workers who
carried out their policies and, thus, helped perpetuate their regimes. The
history of these public sector pension plans is both colorful and instructive.
More than two thousand years ago, the fall of the Roman republic and the
rise of the empire were inextricably linked to the payment, or rather the
nonpayment, of military pensions. During the American Revolution army
pensions became such a sensitive issue that only the personal interven-
tion of George Washington prevented a mutiny of Continental troops over
their promised pension payments. In the nineteenth century the U.S. navy
pension fund went bankrupt on no fewer than three occasions, only to be
bailed out by Congress each time. The management of the navy pension
fund involved misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance of a strikingly
bold nature. These and other episodes, which are detailed in this volume,
provide the reader with a chronology of these historic events and a series of
policy lessons pertaining to current employer-based pension plans. 
In addition, the history of public sector pensions provides a laboratory of
sorts for testing recent proposals for restructuring Social Security. The
analysis also shows that many pension policies that are currently being pro-
posed as new and innovative were part of military pensions at one time or
another. This volume provides the Wrst comprehensive record of the devel-
opment of public pensions in the United States and explains those experi-
ences in light of the continued evolution of employer pensions during the
twentieth and twenty-Wrst centuries. 
It is typically thought that employer-provided pensions in the United
States are a relatively recent form of compensation having been introduced
by employers late in the nineteenth century or early in the twentieth. This
perception is correct concerning private pensions and most public pen-
sions for civilian employees; however, pensions for disabled and retired
military personnel predate the signing of the U.S. Constitution. Military
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pensions have a long history in Western civilization and have often been
used as a key element to attract, retain, and motivate military personnel.
This volume provides a detailed analysis of the establishment of pensions
for American army and navy veterans from colonial times through the
foundation of the modern military retirement system. The history of the
management and funding of these pension systems contains many lessons
for the contemporary debate concerning reform of the Social Security
system, trends in employer pension plans, and the use of pension plans to
achieve human resource objectives. The discussion documents that the
development of pensions for other public sector employees at the state,
local, and federal levels generally occurred in advance of the use of pension
plans in the private sector.
This book has three primary objectives. First, we seek to provide a basic
reference volume on the history of public sector pensions in the United
States. No such comprehensive analysis of the development of these public
pensions exists. Primary reference documents along with the rather sparse
existing literature are the principal sources used to explain the emergence
of pensions in the public sector. The focus is primarily on pensions in the
United States, but we also describe the early development of pensions in
Europe. Second, we explore the history of public pensions to identify pol-
icy lessons for modern day pension analysts. Examining the history of
military and other public pensions offers numerous insights that are useful
to today’s debate on restructuring Social Security and the expansion of
deWned contribution employer-provided pension plans. Finally, there is no
easy way to disentangle the history of public sector pensions from that of
the Wnancial management of the monies in the pension funds and indeed,
the evolution of Wnance itself. Thus, our Wnal objective is to provide a
chronology of the theory and practice of pension fund management. This
history shows that advances in actuarial calculation and Wnancial account-
ing generally contributed to the sound management of pension funds, but
the actual assets held by the early public pension funds were not always
those that were most consistent with the long-run interests of the funds’
annuitants. This Wnding also provides a valuable lesson for current debates
concerning the restructuring of Social Security.
Army and Navy Pension Plans
From their earliest days, the American colonies provided pensions to dis-
abled men who were injured defending the colonists and their property
from native uprisings. During the Revolutionary War the colonies extended
this coverage to the members of their militias. Several colonies maintained
navies and offered pensions to their naval personnel. Independent of the
actions of the colonial legislatures, the Continental Congress established
pensions for its army and navy forces. Military pensions were continuously
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provided, in one form or another, throughout the nineteenth century. The
history of U.S. military pensions shows how Congress used pensions to
provide replacement income for soldiers injured in battle, to offer perfor-
mance incentives, to arrange for orderly retirements, and to respond to
political pressures. These objectives were not always mutually consistent,
and policy choices had to be made then just as they must be made today.
While the history of the army pension plan provides a valuable lesson
in the principles of both economics and U.S. history, the navy pension plan
in the nineteenth century offers a more interesting story because of its
unique system of funding and managing the pension funds. Essentially,
from its inception during the Revolution, the pension plan for ofWcers
and seamen was Wnanced with monies from the sale of captured prizes.
Revenues were very erratic over time, Xuctuating with the fortunes of war
and peace. To manage these monies, Congress established the navy pension
fund and allowed the trustees of this fund to invest the monies in a wide
range of assets, including private equities. The history of the management
of this pension fund illustrates many of the problems that can arise when
public pension monies are used to purchase private assets. The analysis of
the management of the navy pension is particularly timely and important as
Congress debates whether to allow monies in the Social Security trust fund
to be invested in private equities. How these pension monies were managed
in a developing Wnancial market and how policy decisions and national eco-
nomic conditions affected the solvency of the pension plan provide relevant
lessons for the twenty-Wrst century.
The history of the navy pension fund in the nineteenth century is Wlled
with economic and political events that merit review and evaluation as
retirement policy is reconsidered in the twenty-Wrst century. Key events
affecting the nineteenth-century naval pension system include the loss of a
substantial proportion of its assets on bad investments in private equities
and Congress’s bailout of the fund for these losses. In addition, some invest-
ment decisions seem to have been inXuenced by political pressures. The
politically driven investments of the fund along with the bankruptcy of the
fund after Congress greatly expanded beneWts provide important lessons
for the management of public pension plans. The eventual seizure of sur-
plus funds by Congress, the subsequent transfer of these assets to the trea-
sury’s general fund, and the replacement of tradable government debt with
special issue, nontradable government bonds are also interesting develop-
ments in the history of these pension plans. 
In contrast, the history of the army pension plan is much smoother,
as this pension system was always Wnanced on a pay-as-you-go basis from
general revenues. However, both plans illustrate how nineteenth-century
policy-makers used pension plans to achieve their human resource man-
agement objectives. These early pension plans provided performance
incentives, helped attract new recruits, provided retirement and disability
The Evolution of Public Pensions 3
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4 Chapter 1
income to loyal workers, and were often linked with mandatory retirement
to achieve desired patterns of retirement. In addition, we show how these
plans reXected the economics of management differences between the two
services.
Each of these events can be directly related to the current debate con-
cerning proposed changes in the U.S. Social Security system. Privatization,
investment of trust funds in “pet” Wrms, and the moral hazards faced by
government agents were all confronted by early public sector plans, and
questions about their reemergence, should Social Security be “privatized,”
remain. More generally, the debate over national and employer retirement
plans is an issue facing countries around the world. The history described
in this volume provides useful insights for countries at various stages of
economic development, population aging, and Wnancial market structure.
Public Pensions for Civilian Employees
Following the rise of military pensions, retirement plans were extended
to state and local employees much later in the nineteenth century, and
many public workers were not offered pensions until after World War I.
After 1850, several large cities began providing disability and retirement
beneWts to employees in their police and Wre departments. In addition,
some cities also provided beneWts to teachers and other employees. Many if
not most of these early public plans either were disability plans or, if they
were retirement plans, were largely funded with contributions made by the
workers themselves. We have found no references to the use of pensions in
small towns or rural county governments at that time. It was well into the
twentieth century before pensions were generally provided to these public
employees. 
Eventually, some states also began to establish pension plans for state
employees; however, these plans were primarily limited to teachers. Massa-
chusetts established the Wrst retirement pension plan for general state
employees in 1911. The Massachusetts plan initially was something of a
model for subsequent public sector pensions, but it was ultimately replaced
by the standard deWned beneWt plan in which the pension annuity was
based on years of service and end-of-career earnings. Curiously, the Mas-
sachusetts plan resembled, in some respects, what have been referred to
more recently as cash balance plans. The plan required workers to pay up
to 5 percent of their salaries to a trust fund. BeneWts were payable upon
retirement. Workers were eligible to retire at age 60, and retirement was
mandatory at age 70. At the time of retirement, the state purchased an
annuity equal to twice the accumulated value (with interest) of the em-
ployee’s contribution. The calculation of the appropriate interest rate was,
in many cases, not straightforward. Sometimes market rates or yields from
a portfolio of assets were employed; sometimes a rate was simply established
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by legislation (see Chapter 10). In general, the states were quite slow to
adopt pension plans. As late as 1929, only six states had anything like a civil
service pension plan for their employees (Millis and Montgomery 1938).
The record shows that pensions for state and local civil servants are for the
most part twentieth-century developments. 
Nonmilitary federal workers were not systematically provided with retire-
ment beneWts until the establishment of the federal civil service pension
in the early twentieth century. Before the passage of the Federal Employees
Retirement Act in 1920, Congress granted pensions to federal employees on
a case-by-case basis. The 1920 plan created a comprehensive pension system
for U.S. civil service workers. Under this plan, a federal worker qualiWed
for a pension after 15 years of service and upon reaching age 62, 65, or 70,
depending on the worker’s civil service job. Retirement was mandatory
at age 70, though extensions could be obtained in some cases. Workers
contributed 2.5 percent of their salaries toward their pensions, and workers
could earn a maximum pension of 60 percent and a minimum of 30 per-
cent of their average salary in their last ten years of service. 
After 1920, pension coverage in the public sector was relatively wide-
spread, with all federal workers being covered by a pension and an in-
creasing share of state and local employees included in pension plans. In
contrast, pension coverage in the private sector during the Wrst three
decades of the twentieth century remained very low. Even today, pension
coverage is much higher in the public sector than it is in the private sector.
Over 90 percent of public sector workers are covered by an employer-
provided pension plan, whereas only about half of the private sector work
force is covered (Employee BeneWt Research Institute 1997).
Pension Coverage in the Private Sector
The use of retirement plans as a form of labor compensation for private
sector employees began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
nearly 100 years after the adoption of the Wrst U.S. military pensions.
Before focusing the analysis on the evolution of public pensions, a brief
review of the formation of pensions in the private sector is useful as a point
of reference. 
America’s Wrst formal, nonmilitary, employer-provided pension plan was
created by the American Express Corporation in 1875 (Latimer 1932). By
the turn of the century, only a handful of private companies had adopted
retirement pension plans—primarily railroads, public utilities, and Wnan-
cial institutions. There were only 12 private pension plans in 1900 (Costa
1998). These plans were generally noncontributory, paid relatively small
retirement beneWts, and could be terminated at the discretion of the
employer. By 1916, there were 117 private pension plans in existence, and
the number was roughly 200 ten years later (Conyngton 1926). 
The Evolution of Public Pensions 5
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Although path breaking in a way, these plans were not very generous in
comparison to today’s private pension beneWts. The plan offered by the
General Electric Company was typical. After twenty years workers in the GE
plan earned 1.5 percent of their average pay over the last ten years of ser-
vice. Thus, even if wages and salaries increased with tenure, the plan would
yield an annual pension of less than 30 percent of the worker’s pay during
the Wnal year on the job. The American Express plan was even less generous,
paying a beneWt of 1.5 percent for the Wrst $1,200 of average pay over the
last ten years of service and 1.0 percent of everything over that amount; the
plan did provide a minimum beneWt of $30 a month. Subsequent private pen-
sion plans typically paid out or “replaced” a considerably larger percentage
of a worker’s income than these early plans did. Furthermore, as data in
subsequent chapters of this volume illustrate, the early public plans were
typically more generous than these early private pension plans.
Today, the term pension typically is used to refer to a retirement plan. In
the past, pensions were more likely to be associated with disability and the
inability to work due to physical injuries. The contrast between military
pensions, other public sector pension plans, and plans in the private sector
is even greater when considering disability pensions. While seamen and
soldiers had such coverage supplied by the Continental Congress from the
earliest days of the Revolution, in the private sector, well into the twentieth
century, disability pensions or other payments for injuries incurred on the
job were primarily covered by the good will of employers, and when that
proved inadequate workers had to turn to the common law associated with
negligence liability. To collect a disability payment from an employer from
a job-induced injury, a worker had to demonstrate to the satisfaction of a
judge or jury that the employer had not exercised “due care” in the work-
place and that as a result of that negligence the worker was injured. The
value of the protection offered to workers and their dependents from the
common law was paltry by any standard. 
Prior to passage of workers’ compensation legislation beginning in the
1910s, the average expected payment to a widow of a worker who died as a
result of injuries incurred on the job would have been roughly half a year’s
earnings. This was a one-time, lump-sum payment, not an annuity (Fishback
and Kantor 1998). Some of the companies that offered retirement pensions
also had formal disability plans. The amount of the disability payment was
typically the same as that of the pension plan. The disability pension was
usually only granted at the discretion of senior management, the board of
directors, one of the board’s committees, or in some cases special “pension
boards” (Conyngton 1926). 
The relatively slow expansion of pension coverage among private sector
employees continued throughout the Wrst half of the twentieth century.
Only about 15 percent of the private labor force was covered by a pension
in 1940. Thereafter, pension coverage began to expand rapidly in response
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to higher individual tax rates, changes in collective bargaining regulations
concerning pensions, and national economic policies including wage and
price controls that excluded pension payments (see Clark and McDermed
1990). Thus, among the most striking characteristics of public sector pen-
sion plans when compared to private sector plans are their longer history
and the greater value of the public plans.
Implications for Contemporary Policy Analysis
The analysis in this volume presents a comprehensive history of the devel-
opment of public pensions in the United States from colonial times
through the 1920s. The discussion illustrates that pensions were intro-
duced in the public sector to help public administrators attract and retain
quality workers, to provide them with performance incentives, and to
retire them in an orderly fashion. This history of pension plans shows
that understanding pension economics is not just a modern phenomenon.
Government leaders from the Caesars to early modern kings to modern
parliaments have developed pension systems to provide appropriate incen-
tives to their soldiers. In addition, the history of military pensions in
America provides many lessons to those attempting to resolve problems
associated with funding and managing retirement plans in the twenty-Wrst
century. Examples of these lessons are brieXy reviewed below but are exam-
ined in more detail in the ensuing chapters.
An early study of U.S. military pensions summarized the history of mili-
tary pensions in the United States by concluding:
The story is both heartening and depressing. The reader who is also an American
citizen will take a pardonable pride in the fact that, as the story shows, the American
people have been moved by generous impulses in their provision for those who at
one time or another risked their lives in the military and naval service of their coun-
try. But he will be depressed by the account of moral degeneration and political
corruption that gradually crept into the administration and operation of our old
pension system as in the lapse of time the sterner motives and higher ideals which
lead to its adoption faded into the dim background of the memories of the war.
(David Kinley, quoted in Glasson 1918, viii)
From the earliest days of colonial America through the Wrst century of the
United States, pensions were introduced, coverage expanded, and beneWts
formulas changed in response to changing economic conditions and the
need to inXuence the actions of military personnel. Improvements in plans
were made to attract recruits during boom times, pensions were altered
and coupled with mandatory retirement in an effort to increase retirements,
and retirement beneWts were used as deferred compensation in an effort
to provide performance incentives. Knowledge of pension incentives im-
proved throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example,
The Evolution of Public Pensions 7
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the federal civil service pension that covered all federal employees until
1983 provided signiWcant incentives for a worker to remain with the gov-
ernment until the employee was eligible for early retirement beneWts and
then provided signiWcant retirement incentives (Ippolito 1987).
The history of public pensions clearly shows that there is a political, and
economic, risk associated with ongoing retirement plans. The government
can and does change the rules. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
provide numerous examples of such changes, as does the twentieth century.
In the 1800s, Congress expanded veterans’ beneWts to include payments to
widows and orphans and then terminated the beneWt. Between its estab-
lishment of the Social Security system in 1935 and 1975, Congress regu-
larly increased Social Security beneWts; then legislation in 1977 and 1983
reduced expected beneWts. The history of public sector pensions shows that
the risk of government policy changes should be included in any assessment
of the future structure of Social Security.
The history of the operations of the navy pension funds provides addi-
tional lessons for the current debate. The navy pension plan represents one
of the earliest uses of a fund to Wnance the operations of the pension sys-
tem. The record indicates that political pressures played a role in the type
of assets purchased for the fund. Presidential opposition (most notably,
that of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson) probably was responsible
for the trustees not purchasing shares in blue chip investments like the
First, or Second, Bank of the United States. Jackson told one colleague,
future president James K. Polk: “Every one that knows me does know that
I have always been opposed to the U[nited] States Bank,” and he told
another, Martin Van Buren, “I will kill it” (Schlesinger 1945, 76, 89). On the
other side of the ledger, pressure from prominent leaders may well have
led the trustees to buy shares in local banks that were very risky. Have times
changed? If monies from the Social Security trust fund are used to buy pri-
vate equities, will they be required to be allocated to politically acceptable
investments? This could include mandatory purchase of companies in inner
cities or being precluded from investing in companies or industries that are
currently out of political favor. 
Another historical precedent associated with the navy pension fund
occurred in the 1860s. Prizes had been plentiful for the Union navy during
the Civil War; consequently the navy pension fund became quite large. In
the aftermath of the war the fund had sufWcient assets to pay all of its lia-
bilities for the foreseeable future. However, at that point, Congress chose to
expropriate the assets of the fund in order to help pay down the national
debt. The fund’s securities were replaced with special issue bonds that were
not tradable and that yielded smaller interest payments. Since the surplus
monies in the fund could have gone toward beneWts to navy veterans and
their dependents, this action represented a conWscation of wealth on the
part of Congress. This action was clearly based on political inXuences and
not due to an actuarial assessment of the status of the pension fund relative
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to current and future liabilities. These special issue government bonds were
a precursor of the modern day bonds held in the Social Security trust fund.
In a sense, Congress funded the normal operations of the government
in the 1990s through a surplus from the Social Security trust fund on the
promise that in the future sufWcient funds would be appropriated by Con-
gress to pay accrued Social Security beneWts. Congress had done essentially
the same thing with the navy pension fund more than 130 years before.
Beginning in 1800, the navy pension fund was allowed to invest in private
equities. The fund’s experience with these investments proved to be disas-
trous, as all the private Wrms in which it bought shares went bankrupt, and
the fund lost its entire investment. This experience certainly highlights the
risk of private investment with public monies. As noted above, these invest-
ment choices were likely inXuenced by political pressure. The loss of capi-
tal was not the end of the story. The trustees petitioned Congress for funds
to make up for these losses, and Congress appropriated money to cover
both the losses of capital and foregone interest. Once again this illustrates
a point that is often overlooked in the debate concerning different struc-
tures for reforming Social Security. If individuals or groups of individuals
are allowed to invest in private equities, they run a risk of having bad
luck or making poor choices and suffering a capital loss. Would a future
Congress stand by and let a generation of older Americans have lower
retirement beneWts because of a sharp decline in the stock market? Or
would Congress come to the rescue of these retirees and supplement their
pension beneWts?
A Wnal parallel with the current debate on Social Security reform is the
administrative costs of private investments. The navy pension fund used
government agents to buy the shares in the local banks. These agents
charged commissions that reduced the gross return on these investments.
In contrast, some of the fund’s purchases of government securities or
shares in the Second Bank of the United States were made directly from the
treasury, thus limiting the cost of acquisition. In addition, the use of agents
provided opportunities for malfeasance. The agents often retained divi-
dends and other funds for prolonged periods. Such actions deprived the
fund of the opportunity to reinvest these monies. The agents traded from
their own accounts and purchased assets for the fund from those accounts.
One argument against private accounts or investing the Social Security
trust fund in private equities is that this policy will substantially increase the
administrative cost of operating the program (Mitchell 1998). This was cer-
tainly true in the nineteenth century.
Our review of the history of public sector pensions contains an overview of
how pension plans can be used by employers to attract, retain, motivate,
and retire workers. While the formal application of these economic models
has been developed in the past three decades, the history of pensions in the
United States clearly indicates that policymakers in the eighteenth and
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nineteenth centuries understood many of the basic incentives associated
with these plans. 
Because public sector pensions date back more than 2000 years in West-
ern civilization, we must also review some of the key features of the history
of pensions before they became part of U.S. public policy.
As our introduction above suggests, the history of the navy pension
plan during the nineteenth century offers simultaneously a unique history
and some valuable lessons for Social Security reform. Our review covers
the creation of the U.S. navy pension plan during the American Revo-
lution, its subsequent failure, and its revival in the Wrst half of the nine-
teenth century. Both plans were funded with prizes captured by the navy.
We also analyze the Wnancial operations of the navy pension fund during
the nineteenth century and its subsequent failure. We then turn to the
reestablishment of the navy pension fund during the Civil War and the road
to its ultimate demise after Congress expropriated the fund’s assets.
Army pensions date from the Revolution as well. We compare the army
and navy pension schemes since the Revolution. This discussion examines
why the two plans were funded using such different methods and reports
the details of how the two plans were Wnally merged into a single military
pension system.
We emphasize military pensions because they have such a long and
colorful history; however we also review the history of pensions for other
public sector workers as well. This review includes the establishment of the
federal civil service pension plan in the early twentieth century. It also
includes a review of the adoption and management of pensions by state and
local governments. Throughout the analysis, we provide considerable detail
on the size and operation of these early pension plans along with how the
plans were affected by political, economic, and social events.
Overall, the analysis presented in this volume makes three principal
contributions to the study of pensions. First, the historical development of
public pension plans in the United States is comprehensively described.
Important data concerning coverage, fund management, and beneWts paid
have been gleaned from various primary and secondary sources and are
reported throughout the volume. Readers interested in how and why pen-
sions emerged will Wnd this discussion very useful. Second, the experiences
of public pensions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provide
numerous lessons for policy analysts concerned with reforming Social
Security and employer pensions in the twenty-Wrst century. Many of the
reforms currently being discussed were actually implemented and in some
cases discarded in early days. Finally, the volume provides a detailed history
of American Wnancial markets and how they inXuenced the development
of employer pensions. Financial historians will Wnd substantial new infor-
mation to consider concerning rates of return, assets available for pur-
chase, and the maturing of the bond and equity markets.
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